

SUPFIRE # 21A
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COMMENTS ON GSRS PRESENTATION

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1. The presented effort is the most open-minded, careful, and comprehensive approach to the analysis of a weapon system that I have encountered. Having said that, I will save space by listing only adverse remarks.
2. The short-range role of tanks and anti-tank (AT) weapons in combating a "tank surge" would be a factor in the analysis. Even though other weapons may exact a toll on the approaches to FEBA, the tanks and AT's will bear the brunt. This fact may enhance the attractiveness of weapons that delay and canalize the attack.
3. The presentation of targets as circles containing a certain number of elements may be useful for very early screening of candidates. However, even for such use, one should restrict it to targets which will occur with reasonably frequency and can be acquired and engaged in a very timely fashion before they change configuration. Specifically, three tanks in a 50 meter circle does not meet these criteria.
4. I question the number of " Command/Control centers" included in the target mix. Tactical Command Post (CP's) are hard to find, and usually have enough back-up in alternate command channels to make them readily replaceable as to function.
5. The "interdiction" role for GSRS is treated as secondary. I recommend it be considered a very distant second. If the enemy actually launches a massive tank attack, the issue will have been decided long before interdiction can affect the outcome.
6. I recommend careful analysis of the input effort required for target acquisition. If special reconnaissance is required solely for GSRS, this will be a point against it.

7. The discrimination among sensors is primarily based on whether the tanks are hot or cold, moving or still, concealed or unconcealed by local environment. Because of the Legal Mix IV target mix, which contains a number of stationary tanks, percentages may lead to a wrong conclusion. We should remember that a Red tank outside the range of its own gun is of no great interest to us until it fires up and on the move.

8. The 50% probability of 30% kill may have some meaning against complex units - such as an artillery battery. It probably doesn't mean much against tank units.