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## OPERATIONAL AREA NAVAL STRATEGY

HCBrown


The six levels of analysis postulated in NAVCOM # 1, to be used initially as a means of sorting out the manifold questions which may be proposed in regard to any naval system requirement or concept, are as follows:

- I Naval Force Structuring
- II World-Wide Naval Strategy
- III Operational Area Naval Strategy**
- IV Engagement Analysis
- V Duel Analysis
- VI Capability Analysis.

In the long run we will seek answers to all such questions in order of priority, but for now it is essential to fix our attention on one of these complexly interconnected levels so that we may start structuring some methodology and hypotheses for arriving at answers.

Level III - "Operational Area Naval Strategy" has been selected as a starting point. It is proposed to explore this subject as described below, using the Eastern Mediterranean as an example. The upper two Levels of analysis will be replaced with input assumptions (to be later examined at those levels); the lower three Levels of analysis will be examined only to the depth and accuracy necessary to produce credible answers as to what is needed to enable a U.S. strategy having good probability of success.

A simplified sketch of the Eastern Mediterranean is shown; more accurate detail can be obtained from standard references, but will not normally necessary for this level of study.



*Sketch 1*

The area is isolated for the study of non-nuclear Naval Surface Combat by the following assumptions:

- a) Although the U.S. and USSR have come to a direct and active confrontation in the area, neither is willing to risk escalation to a wider conflict. Therefore, all other water areas are peaceful. The Western Mediterranean (including the Tyrrhenian Sea) is a sanctuary (except possibly for surface raids) for U.S. vessels, and the Black Sea is a sanctuary for USSR vessels.
- b) Again to prevent escalation, either side will accept expulsion from the area rather than resort to nuclear weapons.
- c) Hostile shores for U.S. (Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt) are shown as darkened shorelines. From such shores surface-to-surface weapons or land-based aviation may sortie against U.S. ships. Any major ports on such shores can furnish replenishment for USSR ships.
- d) Friendly shores for the U.S. (Israel) are shown as hatched areas. These are in all respects the converse of hostile shores.

- e) All other shores are neutral. They will take neither friendly nor hostile action toward either belligerent unless their three-mile limit is violated. In which case they have the capability of interring the violating vessel. Exceptions to the three-mile limit exist at the Bosphorus-Dardanelles and Straits of Messina; peaceful passage is allowed to either belligerent.<sup>1</sup> (Assumption regarding neutral commerce ?)
- f) The Suez Canal is still closed.
- g) Russia can provide logistic support to Arab armies and for replenishment of USSR vessels at Arab ports by means not dependent on a sea line of communications in the Eastern Mediterranean.

This situation is allied to the Mid-East scenario used for the Interdiction Study, in which certain Arab nations invade Israel by land and sea. Therefore, the Naval objectives of the USSR, in descending priority, are:

- 1) To expel all U.S. surface craft from the Eastern Mediterranean.
- 2) To enable an amphibious attack based on Alexandria and directed against the Israeli Coast.
- 3) To maintain a potential for reconnaissance and gunfire support of Arab units operating in Israel.

The Naval objectives of the U.S., in descending priority, are assumed to be:

- 1) To expel all USSR surface craft from the Eastern Mediterranean.
- 2) To enable water-borne supply of Israel through Jaffa.

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<sup>1</sup> NOTE: Because the status of contiguous shores is expected to have great influence on the outcome of such conflicts in restricted waters, a variation of this situation may be introduced later.

Objectives for the USSR call for the converse objectives for the U.S., therefore it is possible to state all objectives from the U.S. point of view. They are so stated below, in estimated increasing order of difficulty:

Objective A: To maintain some Naval presence in at least the Western end of the operational area, in order to offset Russian military pressure on the neutrals.

Objective B: To prevent Russian-assisted amphibious operations based on Arab ports and launched against the Israeli Coast.

Objective C: To secure a water-borne line of communication through the operational area to Jaffa.

Objective D: To defend the Israeli Coast from any Arab or Russian naval operations.

Objective E: To expel all USSR surface craft from the Eastern Mediterranean.

Having specified operational area, problem-limiting assumptions, and opposed objectives; we must next describe the opposing forces. Our general approach is to describe the USSR forces, at one or more levels of inventory and elemental capability; to indicate the elemental types and capabilities available on U.S. side; and to assess the probability of U.S. success in a given strategy as a function of inventory.<sup>2</sup>

Because we suspect the outcome of naval combat in these restricted waters may be heavily influenced by aircraft and submarines, we desire to first eliminate their influence and then reintroduce them. There being no other convenient pretext, we shall just assume they have not yet been invented. In fact initially we are back to the Battle of the Nile, but with surface craft, shore batteries, communications and sensors of modern capabilities. When we do go to three dimensions of combat, we shall introduce first the aircraft, an element distinctive in its speed range, and then the submarine, an element distinguished by stealth.

For initial study the USSR force is the Black Sea Fleet.

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<sup>2</sup> NOTE: Since our major purpose is not a study of strategy but an indication of the manner in which new capabilities may alter force mix, required force inventory, and strategy, we will of course vary the available U.S. elemental types and their capabilities.

We attempt now to list strategies which may accomplish the listed objectives, hoping to deduce the types of engagement which may result and thereby pass down to that level of analysis (Level IV - Engagement Analysis).

Objective A: The U.S. can accomplish this objective by:

- 1) Protecting an eastward exit from either the Strait of Sicily, the Strait of Messina, or both. If only one is protected as an exit the other must be blocked against Russian use.
- 2) Conducting surface incursions as far east as Libya and Greece.<sup>3</sup>

Objective B: To accomplish this objective, the above strategy must be extended by:

- 1) Providing a capability for reconnaissance and intelligence gathering on the hostile coast.
- 2) Providing a strike capability against amphibious convoys operating on those coasts.

Objective C: To accomplish this objective, the above strategy must be extended by providing a capability for convoying (or otherwise protecting) cargo vessels plying between the Western Mediterranean and Jaffa.

Objective D: To accomplish this objective, the above strategy must be extended by providing a capability to maintain a screening and blockading force which covers the Israeli Coast and contiguous Arab shores. This probably implies that Objective C has been accomplished, in order that U.S. Navy auxiliary vessels may replenish the force.

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<sup>3</sup> This strategy may be acceptable, if the land war is supported by U.S. air and Naval operations from the Indian Ocean.

Objective E: To pass on to this objective the U.S. Navy should:

- 1) Block the Aegean Sea against USSR naval traffic in either direction.
- 2) Search out and destroy Russian surface craft, or at least bottle them up in Arab or neutral ports.

(U.S. strategy and the requisite resources will be studied according to the above progression. It is realized, of course, that other sequences may be applicable. In particular, it may be better in the long run to proceed directly to Objective E by bottling up the Aegean Sea and sweeping USSR ships from the operational area.)

The above development leads to the following list of engagements to be studied:

1. (Objective A-1) Screening (reconnaissance plus on-call defense) of the eastern exits from the Straits of Sicily and Messina. Screen must extend far enough to give high probability of unobserved sortie of a task force.
2. (Objective A-2) Task force sortie to neighborhood of Crete, and return.
3. (Objective B-1) Reconnaissance sortie along the Egyptian coast and return.
4. (Objective B-3) Strike sortie against amphibious force proceeding from Alexandria to Israeli Coast.
5. (Objective C) Convoy protection of cargo vessels between Western Mediterranean and Jaffa.
6. (Objective D) Protective screening of the Israeli Coast.

7. (Objective E-1) Two-way anti-ship barrier in Aegean Sea.
8. (Objective E-2) Destruction of hostile shipping in hostile port.
9. (Objective E-2) Blockade of hostile shipping in neutral port.
10. (Objective E, direct) Search and destroy hostile elements in operational area.

These engagements should be first studied in the light of surface capabilities and surface threat only. Subsequently air, submarines, and both submarines and air are to be introduced.

When these engagement studies have progressed to some presently-undefined stage, it should be possible to return to this level of analysis and make reasonable estimates as to the resources and strategy adequate for reasonable expectation of success in objectives of increasing difficulty. At that point, variations in threat, new capabilities, and changed boundary conditions can be selectively introduce.

